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Recent evidence suggests that solving problems through insight can enhance long-term
memory for the problem and its solution. Previous findings have shown that generation of
the solution as well as experiencing a feeling of Aha! can have a beneficial relationship to
later memory. These findings lead to the question of how learning in problem-solving tasks
in which a novel solution needs to be generated—such as in tasks used to study insight—
differs from the classical generation effect. Because previous studies on learning from insight
on one hand and the generation effect on the other hand have measured different types of
memory, the present study examined two kinds of memory measures: indirect (solving old
and new problems at test) and direct (recognition memory). At encoding, we manipulated
whether participants had the chance to solve Compound Remote Associates Task items and
compared later memory for generated solutions (generate condition) to solutions that were
presented after failing to generate one (fail-to-generate condition), and to solutions that
were presented without a chance at generation (read condition). Participants also reported
if they had an Aha! experience for each problem. While both Aha! experiences and generated solutions were associated with more positive emotional responses, only the generation
variable was associated with differences in later memory performance. While attempts to
generate had an advantage over the read condition in recognition memory performance
(generate > fail-to-generate > read), only when generation was successful did it enhance
the solution rate of old items during testing (generate > read > fail-to-generate). Contrary to
generation effects with other verbal stimuli, these results suggest that the generation effect
in problem-solving tasks in which a novel solution needs to be found differs from the classical generation effect. Seeing a correct solution for a longer time (read) seems in the current
case to be more helpful for solving the same problem later on, compared to being presented
with the solution after a failed attempt at problem solving.

Previous findings suggest that solving problems through
insight can enhance later memory for the problem and solution
(Ash, Jee, & Wiley, 2012; Danek, Fraps, von Müller, Grothe,
& Öllinger, 2013a; Dominowski & Buyer, 2000; Kizilirmak,
Galvao Gomes da Silva, Imamoglu, & Richardson-Klavehn,
2015). The core definition of an insight, as considered in this
paper, is the sudden comprehension of a relationship that until
that moment appeared incomprehensible. A famous example of
such a sudden insight is the anecdote of Archimedes’s discovery of the relationship between the volume submerged and the
water level rising by stepping into the bathtub. In a previous
study employing a pictorial problem-solving task, successfully
generating a solution as compared to being presented with a
solution after failing to generate one, experiencing insight (i.e.,
a feeling of Aha! consisting of surprise and being convinced of
the truth of the solution) as compared to no insight, and the positive emotional response to successful generation and insight,

were all beneficially related to learning (Kizilirmak et al.,
2015). Here, we further illuminate the impact of generating a
solution to a problem by additionally examining a “no-chanceto-solve” condition in which the solution was immediately
provided together with the problem, thus bypassing the chance
to generate, thereby linking our study more closely with the
numerous traditional memory studies on the generation effect
(see next subsection). Moreover, a verbal problem-solving
task is used, the Compound Remote Associates Task (CRAT),
because verbal stimulus material has usually been used to study
the generation effect. The CRAT has been utilized to investigate insightful problem solving in other studies (e.g., Bowden
& Jung-Beeman, 2003; Cranford & Moss, 2010). In the current
study, the subjective Aha! experience and performance on the
CRAT (i.e., generating versus not generating the correct solution to a problem) are both examined in relation to later memory for solutions.
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The Generation Effect
While the subjective Aha! experience may be unique to
insight, the generation of a solution and its positive relationship to later memory are not. The beneficial effect of insight
on learning is therefore likely partially based on the positive
effect of generation on long-term memory formation. The socalled generation effect describes the superiority of generated
items (generate condition) over presented items (read condition) regarding later long-term memory performance (Burns,
1992; Slamecka & Graf, 1978). The generate condition typically involves the production of a word, such as coming up
with a semantic associate or completing a word fragment.
The processes behind the beneficial effect of generation on
memory encoding are not completely understood, but it is
generally agreed that better semantic integration plays an
important role (McElroy & Slamecka, 1982; Slamecka & Graf,
1978). Higher cognitive effort and a deeper level of processing have also been considered, but insufficient evidence has
been found to support those claims (Bertsch, Pesta, Wiscott,
& McDaniel, 2007). The key question arises as to whether
the generation effect in problem solving is a special case of the
generation effect or just a typical case of the generation effect.
The generation effect is investigated by comparing a generate condition in which the target item has to be produced by
the participant, with a read condition, in which the target item
does not need to be generated by the participant but is instead
presented. The read condition does not necessarily imply verbal
item material. It has only become convention to call the condition in which the stimulus is directly presented “read,” because
early generation effect studies used verbal material. The generation rule is typically easy enough so that the vast majority
of the items can be successfully generated, in order to avoid an
item selection effect, that is, where only easy items are successfully generated (Gardiner, Java, & Richardson-Klavehn, 1996;
Slamecka & Graf, 1978).1 For most problem-solving tasks that
are used to investigate insight, this is not the case. These types
of items require creative thinking and are often made to be
almost unsolvable via normal analytical problem-solving strategies (e.g., Mednick, 1962). Typically, a representational change
is required to solve the item, that is, to look at the problem
and solution space from a different angle (Knoblich, Ohlsson,
Haider, & Rhenius, 1999). Hence, especially with the time limit
required in laboratory experiments, and with some individuals being more creative than others, it cannot be avoided that
a considerable number of items are not going to be solved.
In problem-solving tasks used to investigate insight one will
therefore not only have a generate and read condition, but also
most certainly a considerable number of fail-to-generate trials.
One study on the classical generation effect also considered a fail-to-generate condition and showed that later memory is still higher for fail-to-generate than for read, given that
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the correct response is provided after a failed attempt to generate (Slamecka & Fevreiski, 1983). Slamecka and Fevreiski
found that when people were asked to generate the opposites for words, fail-to-generate enhanced free recall performance (compared to read) 24 hours later as much as did
generate (generate = fail-to-generate > read). In comparison,
fail-to-generate did not enhance recognition memory performance as much as generate, although it was still better than
read (generate > fail-to-generate > read). The authors proposed that a word’s semantic-associative attributes have to be
activated for subsequent recall to be successful, which may
also be the case for fail-to-generate, which was proposed to
represent incomplete generation. Incomplete generation was
thought of as the generation of semantic attributes of the solution without arriving at the proper lexical entry. Therefore,
recognition memory, which relies on both surface and semantic properties of the word, benefits less from fail-to-generate
than does free recall. Whether fail-to-generate can also be
considered to represent incomplete generation in problemsolving tasks that have mainly been used to study insight, is
an important question that may dissociate generation effects
on this type of problem from the classical generation effect.
Considering that first ideas about the solution are often misleading and that problem-solving attempts for CRAT problems frequently lead to an impasse that needs to be overcome
(Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 1998; Chein & Weisberg, 2014;
Cranford & Moss, 2012; Hoffman & Subramaniam, 1995), the
fail-to-generate condition in a CRAT problem-solving paradigm may not benefit from incomplete generation.
The Aha! Experience and Later Memory
As previously mentioned, the occurrence of the subjective
Aha! experience is often associated with performance in
certain problem-solving tasks, such as the CRAT. Recent
studies on insight have assessed the experience of such an
Aha! moment by asking the participants about it, and have
also shown that later memory performance for problems
encoded with Aha! is better than for problems encoded without Aha! (Danek et al., 2013a; Dominowski & Buyer, 2000;
Kizilirmak et al., 2015). Such an Aha! experience is typically
defined as the comprehension of the solution being sudden
and unexpected—that participants are completely convinced
of the correctness of the solution, and that the solution is in
hindsight being experienced as easy and very clear (Danek,
Fraps, von Müller, Grothe, & Öllinger, 2014; Topolinski &
Reber, 2010). Also, the Aha! experience is often accompanied by a positive feeling. Previous studies that investigated
insight and learning have focused on the re-solution effect,
in other words the ability to solve problems which have been
solved via an insight during an encoding phase, and again
during a testing phase (Ash et al., 2012; Dominowski &
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Buyer, 2000). It has been reported that solution times were
significantly reduced and solution rates were significantly
higher for previously solved problems. However, re-solving
problems is only one way to assess learning success. More
importantly, generation effect studies have generally used a
different type of memory measure, as explained under the
subsection “Direct Versus Indirect Memory Tests.”
In most studies in which the Aha! experience has been
assessed, this is only done for generated solutions. Generated
solutions with Aha! are then designated as “insight” solutions. However, Kizilirmak et al. (2015) asked participants
whether they experienced an Aha! moment not only when
they generated a solution, but also when they failed to do so
and were shown the solution instead. The definition of an
Aha! experience was phrased such that generation was not
a necessary precondition; the solution could still be comprehended suddenly, appearing utterly convincing and clear as
day when it was comprehended after it was presented following a failed attempt at problem solving. Using this procedure,
Kizilirmak et al. (2015) found that the Aha! experience was
accompanied by a more positive feeling and better memory performance independent of whether the solution to a
problem was generated or not. Thus, in the current study
participants were asked whether they experienced an Aha!
both when they successfully solved a problem on their own
and when they did not. The main design difference from the
prior study was that the addition of the equivalent of a read
condition in the generation-effect studies, in which the solution was presented immediately, and the participant therefore had no chance to find the solution on their own.
Direct Versus Indirect Memory Tests
There are different ways in which long-term memory can be
tested, and as seen in Slamecka and Fevreiski (1983), different measures may be more affected by generation than others. One could classify the different types of tests as direct
and indirect memory tests (see Richardson-Klavehn &
Bjork, 1988, and Richardson-Klavehn, 2010, for extensive
overviews). A test is considered direct/intentional when it
is clearly stated in the instructions for the participant that
memory content should be recalled/recognized. Such tests
are thought to mainly tap into controlled, voluntary retrieval
processes. On the other hand, a test is considered to be indirect or incidental when the task can in principle be solved
based on current skills and knowledge without the necessity to make mental reference to previous experimental
episodes. The instructions for such tests do not include the
instruction to remember anything from a previous experimental learning episode; indeed, participants may even be
explicitly instructed to ignore episodic memory. Such indirect memory tests are thought to mainly tap into automatic,
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involuntary retrieval processes, and it has even been found
that they sometimes show evidence of memory even when
participants lack consciousness of the prior episodes whose
influence is being revealed in their performance.
Nevertheless, it is very important to make a distinction
between the type of test (as defined objectively by instructions) and the type of retrieval process accessed by the
test (see Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork, 1988). Although
the instructions are those of an indirect or incidental test,
the participants might not only use involuntary retrieval
processes to solve the task. For example, consider an experiment in which participants try to solve puzzles in a first session (learning phase) and are tested on solving those same
puzzles and new ones in a second session (memory test). The
test instructions do not say that they should try to remember
the solutions to those problems from the first session. While
solving old problems, participants could involuntarily benefit
from their previous encounter with the problems. However, it
could also be that they consciously recognize an old problem
and voluntarily recall the previous solution. It could even be
that they first unconsciously use their knowledge from their
previous encounter with an old problem until they realize this
consciously and then voluntarily recall the previously learned
information. Similarly, direct or intentional memory tests can
also profit from involuntary memory. Thus, one can only say
that direct and indirect memory tests predominantly tap into
more voluntary versus more involuntary retrieval processes,
respectively. There are ways to clearly dissociate voluntary
and involuntary retrieval processes (Richardson-Klavehn
& Bjork, 1988; Richardson-Klavehn, 2010; see Schott et al.,
2005, for neural evidence), but such a dissociation was not
attempted in the current study.
Most relevant here is that in the problem-solving literature, learning from insight has been mainly investigated with
indirect or incidental memory tests. The memory benefit
from repeatedly solving old items has been termed the resolution effect (Dominowski & Buyer, 2000). The generation
effect, by contrast, has been investigated with many different types of memory tests, of which most can be considered
direct or intentional memory tests. In the 86 studies analyzed
in the meta-analysis by Bertsch et al. (2007), the memory
test was either a recognition memory test (e.g., an item is
presented, and an old or new decision has to be made), a
cued-recall test (e.g., one word of a previously studied word
pair is shown, and the other word has to be retrieved), or
a free recall test (all studied stimuli have to be recalled in
any order). The current study, therefore, employed both
direct/intentional and indirect/incidental memory tests to
gain insight into both relatively more voluntary as well as
relatively more involuntary forms of memory for previously
encountered CRAT problems. Doing so created a further
bridge between problem-solving and memory studies.
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Aims of the Current Study
The aim of the two experiments was to investigate the effects
of having the chance to try to solve a CRAT problem, or not
having the chance to solve the problem at all, with the solution being immediately presented, on long-term memory formation. Moreover, the chance-to-solve category was divided,
post-hoc, into successful generation (note that incorrect generations were infrequent and not further analyzed) and failed
generation (there was no solution at all within the time limit,
but a solution was presented as feedback), and further split for
all categories as to whether an Aha! was experienced or not.
The studies employed a version of the Compound Remote
Associates Task (CRAT) which was adapted from Bowden and
Jung-Beeman (2003), whose task was based on the Remote
Associates Task originally designed by Mednick (1962) to test
creativity in students. In the CRAT, three nouns (i.e., a triad)
are presented that have no obvious association and are therefore considered to be remote associates, for example: manners,
cloth, and tennis. Close associates, such as tennis-racquet, to
single triad words are even misleading (for the solution, see
Figure 1 below). The task is to find a fourth word that can be
used to build compound words with each of the other three,
thereby building a connection between all four words. Two
different measures of later memory were used to evaluate relationships to the encoding conditions just described: (1) more
involuntary memory by means of an indirect memory test of
solutions (Experiment 1), and (2) more voluntary memory by
means of a direct memory test in which an old or new decision was performed either on the complete item (Experiment
1) or on the solution word alone (Experiment 2). The experiments were similar in the encoding phase, but differed in
regard to the memory tests. Learning was incidental because
participants were not informed that their memory would be
tested later on. The indirect memory test (Experiment 1) was
designed to primarily assess the involuntary retrieval of the
solution upon the presentation of the triad, and therefore
assessed the encoding of the association between problem
and solution, whereas the intentional memory test primarily
assessed episodic memory, either for the triad in combination
with its solution (Experiment 1), or for the solution without
the presence of the triad (Experiment 2). The indirect memory
test in Experiment 1 was most comparable with Slamecka’s and
Fevreiski’s free recall procedure, because both heavily rely on
activation spread in associative memory networks (Collins &
Loftus, 1975), whereas the direct memory test was comparable
to Slamecka’s and Fevreiski’s recognition procedure.
Hypotheses
Participants were expected to engage in semantic processing in all conditions, because the connection between the
four words needed to be understood in all of them. It was
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further hypothesized that the resulting association between
the triad and solution would vary in degree. As the semanticassociative processing ends successfully in the generate condition, the association between the triad and solution should be
strongly enhanced. However, in contrast to classical generation
effect studies that employ tasks in which the solution may be
found by analytical problem solving, with successive attempts
gradually coming closer to the solution, thinking of close associations with the triad words in the CRAT is not supposed to lead to
the solution. Thus, memory performance in the fail-to-generate
condition for CRAT problems may differ from the benefit seen in
the Slamecka and Fevreiski study (1983), because the semanticassociative processing does not directly lead closer to the solution. It was hypothesized that failing to generate the solution
might even lead to interference between the correct solution and
the incorrect solutions processed during failed problem solving
(Kane & Anderson, 1978). As incorrect solutions are not considered by the participant in the read condition, the association
between the correct solution and triad might be even stronger than
in the fail-to-generate condition. For the indirect memory
test that relies on associative memory, the following line-up
of memory performance may be expected: generate > read >
fail-to-generate. Alternatively, if searching for the solution leads
to spreading activation that eventually reaches the correct remote
association that is the solution word, which then suddenly emerges
into consciousness (Bowers, Regehr, Balthazard, & Parker, 1990),
the same pattern as found by Slamecka and Fevreiski (1983) could
be expected: generate = fail-to-generate > read.
Regarding the direct memory test that relies on recognition memory, the hypothesis matched the order reported by
Slamecka and Fevreiski (generate > fail-to-generate > read),
because recognition, if mainly based on a feeling of familiarity, should not depend on the strength of the association
between triad and solution. This pattern would be especially
expected when recognition is tested for the solution word alone
(Experiment 2). However, recollection does depend on remembering some details about the encoding episode (Gardiner,
Ramponi, & Richardson-Klavehn, 1998), for which relational
encoding is especially important (Yonelinas & Ritchey, 2015).
Moreover, emotional arousal during stimulus encoding has
specifically been reported to enhance recollection (Anderson,
Yamaguchi, Grabski, & Lacka, 2006; Yonelinas & Ritchey, 2015).
It would therefore be plausible that recollection will be better for
more emotional encoding episodes (generate: feeling of success;
fail-to-generate: frustration, disappointment). Thus, if recognition memory performance is mainly based on recollection, generate and fail-to-generate at encoding might result in better later
memory than read (generate = fail-to-generate > read).
As mentioned earlier, in addition to generation, the subjective experience of insight during the comprehension of
the solution on memory for solutions was also analyzed.
This was done by asking participants whether they had an
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Aha! experience and how happy or unhappy they felt during comprehension. The subjective Aha! experience has been
investigated in insight studies before, and suggests a qualitative difference not only during the processing of the solution
(Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Kounios et al., 2006), but also in
relation to later memory performance (Danek et al., 2013a;
Kizilirmak et al., 2015). Based on previous findings (Danek
et al., 2013a; Kizilirmak et al., 2015), Aha! experiences were
expected to be associated with a relatively better memory performance, compared to solutions understood without Aha!
Because the Aha! experience is usually described to be
accompanied by a positive feeling (Danek et al., 2013a; JungBeeman et al., 2004), it was hypothesized that the generate
condition and Aha! experiences would be associated with a
more positive emotional response than the fail-to-generate
and read conditions, and no Aha! experiences, with failto-generate possibly evoking a more negative emotional
response than read. Such a finding would validate the intrinsically rewarding aspect of the Aha! experience.

Experiment 1
The main aim of Experiment 1 was to test the relationship
between (1) generate, fail-to-generate, and read solutions, and
(2) the subjective feeling of Aha! or its absence, with later memory performance measured with both an indirect and a direct
test after one week. The indirect test measured the solution rate
of old items, in comparison to the solution rate of new items. The
direct test measured the rate of items (their solution included)
correctly recognized as old. These tests were combined to form
a hybrid test (see Richardson-Klavehn, 2010; Schott et al., 2005),
with an indirect and then a direct test on each test item.
Methods
Participants
Participants were 21 German native speakers (7 male, 14
female) with a mean age of 24.1 years (SD = 2.4, range: 20–28).
They participated after giving written informed consent.
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Participants were informed that they had the right to abort the
experiment at any time without any negative personal consequences. Participation was paid with 6 Euros per hour. At the
end of the experiment, participants were debriefed on request
about the purpose of the study. Five participants were excluded
from statistical analysis of the GENERATION (generate, failto-generate, read) × AHA (Aha!, no Aha!) fully crossed design,
because of empty cells in some conditions. The remaining 16
participants (4 male, 12 female) had a mean age of 23.7 years
and were all university students or had a university degree.
Stimulus material and apparatus
A German adaptation of the CRAT (Bowden & Jung-Beeman,
2003) with 180 items was used for the experiment. All items
consisted of nouns or color words. The solution could either
be used as a prefix or a suffix with each of the triad words to
form a compound word. Table 1 shows three examples. Some
items were homogeneous, i.e., the solution could be affixed
to all of the triad words in the same way (only as a prefix or
only as a suffix, see Example 1, Table 1), while others were
heterogeneous, that is, whether the solution could be used
as a prefix or suffix varied between the triad words (Example
2, Table 1). Since the authors of the original task found no
performance difference between heterogeneous and homogeneous items, these were kept approximately equal. Due to
the nature of the German language, in some cases one word
needed to be slightly modified to form a compound word
with another (see Example 3, Table 1, “Meile” and “Stein” can
be combined to “Meilenstein”). Solution words were never
repeated or used as triad words. Triad words were rarely
repeated but not more than twice.
On the basis of unpublished normative data, the lists were
split into four sublists that matched regarding (1) the solution rate, (2) plausibility, and (3) the probability of an Aha!
experience accompanying comprehension of the solution.
Two lists were assigned to the chance-to-generate condition (90 items, later split into generate and fail-to-generate
based on participants’ responses), one list to the no-chanceto-generate (read) condition in which the solution was

Table 1
Examples of Compound Remote Associate items.

Triad words
(1) Manieren, Tennis, Tuch
manners, tennis, cloth
(2) Stufe, System, Feuer
level, system, fire
(3) Kiesel, Meile, Zeit
pebble, mile, age

Solution word
Tisch
table
Alarm
alarm
Stein
stone

Compund word
Tischmanieren, Tischtennis, Tischtuch
table manners, table tennis, table
Alarmstufe, Alarmsystem, Feueralarm
alarm level, alarm system, fire alarm
Kieselstein, Meilenstein, Steinzeit
pebble stone, mile stone, stone age
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immediately presented (45 items), and one list was used as
new items in the memory test (45 items). The assignment of
lists to conditions was counterbalanced across participants
by means of a reduced Latin square. However, as some participants were excluded from data analysis, the assignment
of lists to participants employed a compromise of following
the Latin square while still acquiring enough participants per
condition for the analysis.
The Aha! or no Aha! decision was made on the basis of a
written definition of the subjective Aha! experience, which
was provided as part of the instruction for the learning
phase. The definition of the Aha! experience read approximately as follows (translated from German) and was based
on the criteria listed by Topolinski and Reber (2010), with
the exception of the “positive emotional response” criterion
because this was evaluated separately:
By ‘aha!’ experience we are referring to the feeling of a
sudden insight, that is, the surprising comprehension
for a previously seemingly unsolvable problem. At this
moment of insight, you are convinced of the correctness of the solution. The solution suddenly appears
to be as plain as day. If you find the solution on your
own, you are usually unaware of how it came into
your mind. The described feeling of ‘aha!’ does not have
to be overwhelming, but should closely correspond to
this description.
The emotional response to comprehending the solution
was measured by means of a 5-point graphical smiley interval scale (numerical values: -2 to +2) ranging from very sad
(mouth: upper half of a circle, -2) to neutral (mouth: flat horizontal line, 0) to very happy (mouth: lower half of a circle, +2).
A standard desktop PC with Windows XP (Microsoft,
Redmond Campus, Washington, USA) was used and stimuli were presented on a 19” TFT screen with a 60 Hz frame
rate and 1280 × 1024 pixels resolution. Stimulus presentation and collection of behavioral data were controlled with
Presentation 16.3 (Neurobehavioral Systems, Berkeley, CA).
All responses were made with a standard USB keyboard.
Statistics were analyzed with SPSS 22 and 23 for Windows 7
64-bit (IBM, Armonk, NY, USA) and the effect size calculator
(used to calculate Cohen’s d provided by Melody Wiseheart
on http://www.cognitiveflexibility.org/effectsize).
Design
The design was a 3 × 2 within-subjects design. Of main interest was the relationship between GENERATION (generated,
fail-to-generate, read), AHA (Aha!, no Aha!), and later memory performance (either the solution rate of old items, or the
recognition rate of old items) and on the emotional response
during the comprehension of the solution. A priori, two conditions formed an experimentally manipulated variable: items
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with a chance to generate a solution, whereby the solution was
either successfully generated or was, in the case of generation
failure, provided after a time limit ran out, and items with an
immediately provided solution and thus no chance to generate (read condition). The former were post-hoc split into
generate (correctly solved) and fail-to-generate (no solution
within time limit). Incorrect solutions were discarded from
analysis. Memory performance was tested in two ways: first,
with an indirect memory test, in which subjects were asked to
try solving old and new problems regardless of whether they
were perceived as old or new, followed by a direct memory
test, that is, an old or new recognition memory task.
To avoid the perceived plausibility of any provided solution complicating the results due to, for example, individual
differences in vocabulary, we asked participants to make a
plausible or implausible judgment for each item (see Figures 1
and 2) and excluded all items rated as implausible in both the
learning and/or test phase from further analysis. Moreover,
generated solutions were manually rated as correct or incorrect by the experimenter before data analysis (as in the original RAT by Mednick, 1962, all items supposedly only had one
possible correct solution). When participants solved a problem incorrectly, it could have a number of complicated effects
on remembering the correct solution later on (e.g., cognitive
interference between the correct and incorrect solutions during encoding/retrieval). Such incorrectly solved trials were
rare and were therefore excluded from all statistical analyses.
Task and procedure
The experiment consisted of two sessions: a learning phase
and a testing phase that was conducted one week after the
learning phase. In the learning phase, participants were presented with CRA items and were either instructed to try to
solve the items or just to try to understand the solution when
it was provided. Since it has been reported that the generation effect is larger for incidental learning (Bertsch et al.,
2007), participants were not informed about the memory
test but were told that the second session would be similar
to the first one. In the testing phase, memory for the items
was tested with direct and indirect tests. Both sessions were
held in the same dimly lit behavioral testing room and with
the same apparatus. Before the start of each session, participants were handed written instructions which they summarized verbally for the experimenter to make sure they had
understood everything correctly. While the experiment was
running, the experimenter sat in an adjacent room, seeing a
display with the identical stimulation provided to the participant, and jotting down their oral responses.
Learning phase. In the learning phase (see Figure 1), participants were informed that there would be two versions of trials: those in which the correct compound word for the triad
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Figure 1.
Learning phase. Example trials of the three generation conditions (generate, fail-to-generate, read). Stimulus presentation had the
same duration for all conditions (33 s total) and in each condition, the solution had to be spoken out loud.

had to be found within a time limit of 20 s (chance to generate: generate and fail-to-generate conditions) and others
in which the solution word was given and the task was to
understand how the solution could be used to create compound words with each of the triad words (read condition).
The total presentation duration of the item was held constant
(33 s) across the three different levels of GENERATION
(generate, fail-to-generate, read) to avoid the duration for
processing items as a confound for memory performance
differences between conditions.2
In trials with a chance to generate the solution, the
problem, that is, the three stacked triad words on top of a
question mark in place of the solution, was presented for
a maximum of 20 s or until a response was made. Participants
were instructed to press the spacebar as soon as they came
up with the solution word (e.g. “table”) and to speak it out
loud immediately after button press. The interval for the oral
response was 3 s, during which the question mark was highlighted in green. Immediately after, the question mark was
replaced by the solution word, which was presented for the
remainder of 33 s (which was calculated as 30 s minus the
response time as depicted in Figure 1). It was emphasized

that they only press the button when they were ready to
speak out the answer. Participants were instructed to pay
further attention to the item on the screen until item offset.
When no response was made within the time limit (failto-generate condition), the solution word was presented in
place of the question mark for a maximum of 10 s or until
a response was made. Participants were instructed to press
the space bar and read the solution word out loud as soon as
they understood it. After the button press, the solution word
was highlighted in green to indicate the oral response should
be made. This display was presented for the remainder of the
33 s, which was calculated as 13 s minus the response time
from the first solution display.
In the read condition, the procedure was the same except
that there was no search phase, but the solution was presented
immediately with the triad. Within the first 20 s, participants
indicated their comprehension of the solution by pressing the
space bar, followed by reading the solution word out loud.
Again, the button press changed the color of the solution word
which was highlighted in green. This display remained active
for the remainder of the 33 s which was calculated as 30 s minus
the response time to the first display of triad and solution.
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Figure 2.
Memory test of Experiment 1. An indirect (solving old and new items) and a direct memory test (old/new recognition) were applied.

Oral responses had to be made in all three conditions (generate, fail-to-generate, read) to avoid the additional encoding based
on speech production as a potential confound for later memory
differences. Either the question mark (generate trials) or the
solution (fail-to-generate and read trials) changed color from
white to green to indicate the interval for speech upon pressing space. Following the item presentation, participants were
asked if they had an Aha! experience and answered with “yes”
or “no” by pressing the left or right arrow key (assignment of
the arrow keys was counterbalanced across participants). After
button press, the next display was shown in which participants
were asked how they felt when they understood the solution.
Participants answered on a 5-point smiley scale as explained in
the materials section. They could navigate to the chosen smiley
via the arrow keys, with the currently chosen smiley highlighted
by a red frame. Pressing the space bar confirmed their choice
and led to the next display. Lastly, participants were asked if
they thought of the solution as plausible, answering with “yes”
or “no” (arrow keys). This button press ended the trial. All trials
started with a fixation cross (0.5 s). The task consisted of 135 trials, including three practice trials. Two short breaks of approximately 5 min were made after groups of 45 trials.
Test phase. One week later and approximately at the same time
of day as the learning phase, participants were tested for
their memory. They were presented with the 135 old CRA
items from the learning phase as well as 45 new ones, resulting in a total of 180 trials. The task mainly corresponded to the
chance-to-generate condition of the learning phase, that is,
the trial timing was similar and participants were instructed to
try to solve the problem within a time limit of 20 s (see Figure 2).
It was emphasized that participants should not try to recall the
solution but rather just try to solve the item regardless of whether
they thought of it as old or new (indirect test to measure primarily involuntary memory; Richardson-Klavehn, 2010; Schott et al.,
2005). Instead of the Aha! question and the affective rating, participants were then asked if they recognized the item from the last
session (“yes” or “no” answer via arrow keys). The button press led
to the last display in which participants were again asked if they
found the solution plausible (“yes” or “no” answer via arrow keys).
There were two short breaks after groups of 60 trials.

Data analysis
All items rated as implausible were discarded from the
analysis. First, data were descriptively analyzed in regard
to our true independent, manipulated variable, that is,
chance-to-solve versus no-chance-to-solve, and the objective dependent variables for memory performance, that is,
solution rates of old items and recognition rates of old items.
Secondly, inferential statistics were computed based on posthoc splits of the chance-to-solve condition into generate (correct solutions only, incorrect solutions were discarded from
analysis) and fail-to-generate (no solution within the time
limit). Additionally, all GENERATION conditions (generate,
fail-to-generate, read) were further split into Aha! and no
Aha!, based on the subjective ratings of the participants. For
this analysis, all incorrect trials were also excluded. Data
were analyzed for both memory measures as dependent variables and also for the subjective measure of the emotional
response rating as a dependent variable using 3 × 2 repeatedmeasures ANOVAs with factors GENERATION (generate,
fail-to-generate, read) and AHA (Aha!, no Aha!). In case of significant violations of the sphericity assumption, GreenhouseGeisser (1959) corrected F and p values, the correction
parameter epsilon (ε), and uncorrected degrees of freedom are
reported. Partial eta squared (ηp2) and Cohen’s d are reported as
measures of effect size for all ANOVAs and all t-tests, respectively. For the emotional rating analysis, the median per participant was used before analysis of the means across participants.
Results
Plausibility ratings revealed that .96 (SD = .05) of all old items
were rated as plausible in both learning and test phase, and
.91 (SD = .07) of all new items were rated as plausible in the
test phase. In the learning phase, a solution was generated
to .43 (SD = .12) of all chance-to-solve items. Of all generated solutions, .86 (SD = .09) were correct. After discarding
all incorrectly generated solutions, .45 (SD = .10) of all
chance-to-solve items were correctly generated (from here on,
generate refers to correct solutions only) and in the remaining
.55 no solution was generated at all (fail-to-generate condition).
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Table 2
Mean conditional frequencies of all conditions in Experiment 1 (n = 21).

Condition
P(generate ∩ no Aha! | chance to generate)
P(generate ∩ Aha! | chance to generate)
P(fail-to-generate ∩ no Aha! | chance to generate)
P(fail-to-generate ∩ Aha! | chance to generate)
P(no Aha! | read)
P(Aha! | read)
The number of items per level of GENERATION was therefore
relatively balanced (means of 40.5 items generated, 49.5 items
fail-to-generate, 45 items read). The mean frequency of all
combinations of GENERATION (generated, fail-to-generate,
read) and AHA (Aha!, no Aha!) can be found in Table 2.
Solution rates of old items (indirect memory test measure)
At first, all 21 participants are considered. Old items had
a significantly higher solution rate (.64, SD = .09) than
new items (.33, SD = .10) for all participants [t(20) = 14.6,
p < .001, Cohen’s d = 3.197], corroborating that learning occurred. Participants solved .64 (SD = .09) of the
chance-to-solve items at test (collapsed over generate and
fail-to-generate) and .63 (SD = .10) of the no-chance-to-solve
(read)items.However,thedifferencebetweentherelationshipsof
chance-to-solve and no-chance-to-solve to later memory
becomes evident when splitting chance-to-solve for generate
and fail-to-generate, as was done in the analysis below.
To investigate the relationship between AHA
(Aha!, no Aha!) and GENERATION (generate, failto-generate, read) and later solution rates during testing, a 2 ×

Mean
.21
.24
.14
.41
.69
.31

SD
.14
.18
.16
.14
.35
.35

3 repeated-measures ANOVA was run with the solution rate
of old items as dependent variable. For this analysis, the five
participants who had zero trials in one of the combinations
were discarded. As shown in Figure 3A, there was no effect of
AHA, but a main effect of GENERATION [F(2,30) = 26.72,
p < .001, ηp2 = .640]. For the means and standard deviations
(SD) that were used in this and all other ANOVAs, please
refer to Table 3. Not surprisingly, when participants generated a solution for problems during learning, they had a high
probability of solving them again during testing, whereas the
solution rate during test was lowest for problems where participants failed to generate a solution during learning. As can
be seen in Figure 3A, the read condition scored in between.
This pattern was validated via post-hoc tests. Generate (.86,
SD = .09) was associated with significantly higher solution
rates at test compared to fail-to-generate (.46, SD = .12)
[t(15) = 14.9, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 3.875] and compared to
read (.64, SD = .10) [t(15) = 9.03, p < .000, Cohen’s d = 2.278].
Fail-to-generate was associated with significantly lower solution rates at test than read [t(15) = 6.63, p < .001, Cohen’s d
= 1.674]. It should be noted that even though the lowest solution rate was seen for the fail-to-generate condition it was

Table 3
Mean conditional frequencies of all conditions in Experiment 1 (n = 21). Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.

Experiment
Experiment 1
(N = 16)

Test
measure
Indirect
Direct

Experiment 2
(N = 14)

Emotional
Response
Direct
Emotional
Response

Aha!

Generate

Generation
Fail-to-generate

Aha!
No Aha!
Aha!

0.79 (0.16)
0.82 (0.26)
0.82 (0.20)

0.48 (0.13)
0.39 (0.26)
0.86 (0.15)

0.51 (0.31)
0.67 (0.13)
0.74 (0.24)

Aha!
No Aha!
Aha!
No Aha!
Aha!
No Aha!

1.09 (0.52)
0.78 (0.55)
0.45 (0.17)
0.38 (0.20)
1.18 (0.46)
0.68 (0.61)

0.44 (0.63)
0.00 (0.66)
0.35 (0.15)
0.36 (0.21)
0.46 (0.57)
-0.18 (0.37)

0.69 (0.48)
0.31 (0.48)
0.27 (0.32)
0.26 (0.15)
0.75 (0.55)
0.07 (0.27)
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Figure 3.
Memory performance in Experiment 1. A. Mean solution rate of old items during
the indirect memory test. The solution rate of new items at test is depicted for
comparison. B. Mean hit rate during the direct memory test for solutions presented problems. The false alarm rate (new items incorrectly identified as old) is
depicted for comparison.

still marginally higher than the solution rate of new items
during testing [t(15) = 2.02, p = .062, Cohen’s d = 0.657].
The difference between generate and fail-to-generate suggests a possible selection effect for item difficulty. In other
words, it could have been that only easy items and their solutions were learned, and easy items more often landed in the
generate condition. This issue was addressed empirically by
making a distinction between difficult and easy items based on
a median split of the generation rates using our unpublished
normative data (i.e., independent data). Indeed, significantly
more difficult items landed in the fail-to-generate compared to
the generate condition [.66 (SD = .05) vs. .29 (SD = .06); t(15)

= 19.05, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 6.428]. However, easy items were
not necessarily learned better. To compare the learning rates
for difficult and easy items, solution rates at test were compared for old difficult and old easy items, as well as new difficult and new easy items. The learning rate was operationalized
as the solution rate for old minus new items for difficult and
easy items, respectively. A dependent samples t-test between
the learning rate for difficult versus easy items revealed no
statistical difference [.14 (SD = .07) vs. .17 (SD = .08); t(15)
= 1.16, p = .263, Cohen’s d = 0.394]. Thus, critically, the difference between fail-to-generate and generate cannot simply be
attributed to difficult items being learned more poorly.
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Figure 4.
Emotional response in Experiment 1. Depicted is the mean of the individual median emotional response as measured by a rating on a 5-point scale during the comprehension of the solution.

Recognition memory for solutions presented with problems (direct memory
test measure)
In total, .82 (SD = .15) of all old items were correctly recognized as such. After subtracting false alarms, discrimination
was still at .64 (SD = .15). Participants correctly recognized
.88 (SD = .14) of old chance-to-solve items and .72 (SD
= .19) of old no-chance-to-solve items. Here, generate and
fail-to-generate did not differ in regard to later memory as
becomes evident from the analysis below.
As with the solution rate during test, a 2 × 3 repeatedmeasures ANOVA with factors AHA and GENERATION
was run with hit rate as the dependent variable. For this
analysis, the five participants with empty cells were again
discarded. Again, we found a main effect of GENERATION
[F(2,30) = 5.52, p = .009, ηp2 = .269], but no effect of AHA.
In contrast to the solution rates of old items, both generate (.85, SD = .15) and fail-to-generate (.85, SD = .15) led to
significantly higher hit rates than read (.69, SD = .20) [t(15)
= 4.88, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.313 and t(15) = 6.74, p < .001,
Cohen’s d = 2.050], but they did not differ from each other
[t(15) = 0.011, p = .992, Cohen’s d = 0.002] (see Figure 3B).
This suggests that attempting to solve a CRAT item enhances
later memory for it, even if generation fails, when memory
is tested with a recognition memory test. However both the
triad and the solution were presented during the recognition memory test, and it is therefore unclear whether only
the triad, the solution, or both might have been encoded

successfully. Moreover, hit rates appear to be at ceiling for
generate and fail-to-generate, which might account for the
absence of a statistical difference.
Emotional response. To investigate whether the emotional
response differed in quality depending on the generation
of the solution or whether an Aha! experience was reported
during comprehension, a 2 × 3 repeated-measures ANOVA
with factors AHA (Aha!, no Aha!) and GENERATION
(generated, fail-to-generate, read) was computed for the
median of the affective rating. Again, the five participants
with empty cells were excluded from analysis. Main effects
of GENERATION [F(2,30) = 11.60, p < .001, ηp2 = .436] and
AHA [F(1,15) = 15.00, p = .002, ηp2 = .500] were revealed. As
can be seen in Figure 5, Aha! (0.774, SD = 0.39) was rated
significantly higher than no Aha! (0.51, SD = 0.35) [t(15)
= 4.37, p = .001, Cohen’s d = 0.608]. Generation (0.94, SD
= 0.47) was also accompanied by a significantly more positive response in comparison to fail-to-generate (0.22, SD
= 0.54) [t(15) = 4.11, p = .001, Cohen’s d = 1.029] and to read
(0.50, SD = 0.41) [t(15) = 2.15, p = .048, Cohen’s d = 0.580],
while fail-to-generate received lower affective ratings than
read [t(15) = 2.15, p = .048, Cohen’s d = 0.550].
Discussion
The results revealed that although generate and Aha! were
accompanied by a positive emotional response, only the factor GENERATION showed a significant relationship to later
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Figure 5.
Memory test of Experiment 2: Exemplary trial.

memory. When an Aha! experience was reported, this was
accompanied by a relatively more positive emotional response
than no Aha! at all levels of GENERATION. This supports
the notion that the Aha! experience induces a positive feeling—even when it cannot be pride of correctly solving a CRAT
problem. As for GENERATION, generate was accompanied
by the most positive emotional response, followed by read,
with the least positive, relatively neutral emotional response for
fail-to-generate. While the emotional response to successful
generation can probably be explained by pride, the least positive
response may be due to disappointment of not being able to solve
the item. However, since subjects were not asked about the reasons
for these feelings, this result could be investigated in future studies.
Despite the difference between Aha! and no Aha! in regard
to the emotional response, AHA did not show a significant relationship to later memory; only GENERATION did. Moreover,
depending on whether memory was tested with an indirect or
direct test, the ordinal ranking between conditions differed.
When the requirement was to solve old items (indirect test), the
pattern was generate > read > fail-to-generate, whereas the pattern seen in previous studies was generate = fail-to-generate >
read (although in a free recall task; the first current study is apparently the first to use an indirect memory test). When the requirement was to recognize the complete item (problem + solution;
direct test), it was generate = fail-to-generate > read, whereas the
pattern was generate > fail-to-generate> read in previous studies. On first view, this result suggests that learning from CRAT
problem solving is indeed a special case of generation. However,
since the apparent equality between generate and fail-to-generate
for the direct memory test may have been due to ceiling effects,
a second experiment made old/new decisions more difficult by
testing the solution word without its triad as context.

Experiment 2
To eliminate the ceiling effects of the first experiment, the
second experiment presented only the solution word as part
of a guess/remember/know recognition memory task (see

Gardiner & Richardson-Klavehn, 2000). Unfortunately, too
few remember responses were given, so remember and know
response categories had to be collapsed. The second experiment corresponded to the first one, except for the testing
phase (Figure 2). Below only methodological differences to
the first experiment are described.
Methods
Participants
Twenty-two German native speakers (8 male and 14 female)
with a mean age of 24.6 years (SD = 2.5, range: 21–32) participated in the experiment. Due to empty cells, only 14
participants could be included in the GENERATION × AHA
analyses. The remaining participants had a mean age of 24.7
years, and five were male; nine were female.
Task and procedure (testing phase)
Participants were presented with solution words of all old
items as well as with solution words of new items3 and were
tested for their recognition memory (see Figure 5). After the
presentation of a fixation cross (0.5 s), single solution words
were shown in the center of the screen and participants were
instructed to decide whether the word was old or new by pressing the left or the right arrow key. The display remained until
button press. Participants were instructed to only choose new
if they were sure about it and to choose old when they were
sure about it as well as when they were insecure. If participants
chose new, the next trial started. If they chose old they were
asked to indicate whether their decision was just a guess or if
they knew or even remembered the solution word. Participants
were instructed to choose know if they were sure that it was old
but did not remember any further context information, and
to choose remember when they did remember some context
information (e.g., their thoughts when they saw the solution
in the learning phase or even the related triad). They should

docs.lib.purdue.edu/jps

70

2016 | Volume 9

J. M. Kizilirmak, B. Wiegmann, and A. Richardson-Klavehn

choose guess if they could not categorize the item into one of
the other categories. Participants made their choice by pressing the right, down, or left arrow key. If they chose guess or
know, the next trial started. If they chose remember, they were
asked to describe the remembered information to the experimenter, who wrote it down. By pressing the space bar, participants could end the trial and proceed. Again, 135 trials were
presented during encoding and 180 during retrieval. Short
breaks were made after groups of 45 and 60 trials respectively.
Analysis
In the second experiment, the recognition rate for solution
words was the only measure of memory performance. It was
planned to analyze the relationship between GENERATION
(generated, fail-to-generate, read) × AHA (Aha!, no Aha!)
for remember and know responses separately. However, this
analysis was not possible because remember responses were,
unexpectedly, scarce (possibly due to the long retention
interval and the use of single-word test stimuli). Remember
and know responses were therefore collapsed, resulting in
only one measure of recognition memory for old items (i.e.,
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correct “old” responses). False alarms (i.e., incorrect “old”
responses to new items) were treated correspondingly. Guess
responses were excluded from the analysis, because they
may reflect different decision strategies than true recognition (Gardiner & Richardson-Klavehn, 2000). Also, as in
Experiment 1, items rated as implausible and incorrect generations were excluded from analysis.
Results
Plausibility ratings revealed that .93 (SD = .05) of all old
items were rated as plausible during the learning phase and
included in the analysis. In the learning phase, a solution was
generated to .36 (SD = .06) of all chance-to-solve items. Only
.05 (SD = .05) of all chance-to-solve items were solved incorrectly. After discarding all incorrect generations, .41 (SD
= .05) of all chance-to-solve items were correctly generated.
Recognition memory for solutions (direct memory test measure)
Mean hit rate was .59 (SD = .23). Corrected for false alarms,
discrimination was still at .38 (SD = .18), although considerably lower than that in Experiment 1. Of all chance-to-solve

Figure 6.
Memory performance in Experiment 2. Mean hit rate during the direct recognition memory test for solutions.
The false alarm rate (new items incorrectly identified as old) is depicted for comparison.
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items (generate, fail-to-generate), .66 (SD = .22) and .48
(SD = .29) of all no-chance-to-solve items (read) were correctly recognized as old. When splitting chance-to-solve into
generate and fail-to-generate, it becomes evident that those
conditions differ significantly in regard to later recognition
memory, as revealed in the analysis below.
A 2 × 3 repeated-measures ANOVA with factors
AHA (Aha!, no Aha!) and GENERATION (generate,
fail-to-generate, read) was run with hit rate as dependent
variable. Partially replicating the result of Experiment 1,
only a main effect of GENERATION was found [F(2,26)
= 5.68, p = .013, ηp2 = .304, ε = .871]. As can be seen in Figure
6, read (.26, SD = .15) differed significantly from generate (.42,
SD = .15) and fail-to-generate (.34, SD = .14) as revealed by
post-hoc dependent-samples t-tests [generate vs. read: t(13)
= 3.96, p = .002, Cohen’s d = 1.060; fail-to-generate vs. read: t(13)
= 2.10, p = .056, Cohen’s d = 0.563]. In contrast to Experiment
1, there was also a significant difference between generate and
fail-to-generate [t(13) = 2.21, p = .046, Cohen’s d = 0.592].
Emotional response
The same 2 × 3 repeated-measures ANOVA as above with the
median of the affective rating as dependent variable for individual participants was computed to investigate whether the
emotional response differs in quality depending on AHA and
GENERATION. Only the 14 participants without empty cells
were included. As shown in Figure 7, and generally replicating
the effect pattern from Experiment 1, there were main effects
of GENERATION [F(2,26) = 17.47, p < .001, ηp2 = .573] and
AHA [F(1,13) = 58.60, p < .001, ηp2 = .818], with higher ratings for generate (0.93, SD = 0.48) than fail-to-generate (0.14,
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SD = 0.38) [t(13) = 4.58, p = .001, Cohen’s d = 1.644], higher
ratings for fail-to-generate than for read (0.41, SD = 0.32)
[t(13) = 2.26, p = .042, Cohen’s d = 0.767], and higher ratings
for Aha! (.80, SD = .34) than no Aha! (.40, SD = .33) [t(13)
= 5.69, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.168].
Discussion
While emotional response showed the same independent relationships to GENERATION and AHA as in Experiment 1, the
direct memory test used in the current experiment revealed
different results than the direct memory test in Experiment
1. First, there was no longer a ceiling effect. Second, not only
did generate and fail-to-generate differ significantly from
read, but also from each other, leading to the pattern: generate > fail-to-generate > read. This is the same pattern that
one would expect from Slamecka’s and Fevreiski’s study on
the classical generation effect (Slamecka & Fevreiski, 1983). It
further suggests that recognition performance is not dependent on the exposure time to the solution during encoding,
which was longest for read (presented for the whole 33 s),
shortest for fail-to-generate (presented for 13 s), and medium
for generate (presented for approximately 25 s, depending on
the solution time, which had a mean of 8 s).

General Discussion
The Generation Effect in Problem Solving
The current study investigated the relationship between problem solving and long-term memory formation in a verbal
problem-solving task. The main focus was on the generation

Figure 7.
Emotional response in Experiment 2. As can be seen, the pattern generally corresponds to the one from Experiment 1.
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effect, a beneficial effect of generating solutions on later
memory, and whether the generation effect in problemsolving tasks that are used to study insight (using the example
of the CRAT) represents a special case of the generation effect
as observed in traditional memory studies. Memory was
compared for generate, fail-to-generate, and read conditions,
and in relation to subjective reports of Aha! experiences. In
addition, we investigated whether comprehending the solution differed not only in terms of later memory, but also in
terms of the emotional response, depending on the generate
/fail-to-generate/read and the Aha!/no Aha! variables.
Whereas previous studies showed that both the generation of a solution and the subjective feeling of Aha! were positively related to later memory performance, in this study a
relationship was only found for generation. More specifically,
generating a solution was associated with the best later memory performance as measured by both indirect and direct
memory tests. Memory performance for fail-to-generate and
read items differed depending on the type of test. The overall pattern for the indirect test (solution rate of old items) in
Experiment 1 was generate > read > fail-to-generate, whereas
for the direct memory test (old/new recognition of the solution) it was generate > fail-to-generate > read (when ceiling
effects were eliminated in Experiment 2). As summarized
in the “Introduction,” a generation study in which people
were asked to generate the opposites of words compared
fail-to-generate with generate and read conditions and
reported that fail-to-generate is equal to generate for the free
recall of the target item (generate = fail-to-generate > read),
but not for recognition memory, where fail-to-generate
was associated with a poorer performance (generate > failto-generate > read) (Slamecka & Fevreiski, 1983). Slamecka
and Fevreiski interpreted this finding as a result from
fail-to-generate corresponding to incomplete generation,
whereby the item’s semantic attributes were activated similarly as in a generate condition. Successful generation is considered to consist of two stages: generating adequate semantic
attributes of the solution and arriving at the respective lexical
entry that also includes surface features of the word. Since
recognition memory relies not only on semantic, but also
on surface and processing, fail-to-generate falls short in this
regard compared to generate. In regard to CRAT problem
solving, although semantic-associative processing in the
case of fail-to-generate may not lead closer to the solution, it
facilitates later recognition of the solution compared to read,
where only a minimum of semantic processing is required to
comprehend the presented solution.
In our indirect memory test, that is, trying to solve old
items again at test, no memory advantage for fail-to-generate
compared to read was found. In fact, items whose solutions
had failed to be generated during encoding had a poorer
solution performance at test than items whose solutions were
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read during encoding. These results are consistent with the
idea that failing to generate the solution on CRAT problems
may lead to interference between the correct solution and the
incorrect solutions processed during failed problem-solving
attempts (Kane & Anderson, 1978). The memory advantage
for solving old CRAT items again when they were previously
successfully generated, in comparison to fail-to-generate, is
in line with the results of Dominowski and Buyer (2000).
However, that study did not include a read condition.
Our findings are in support of the notion of Metcalfe
(1986a), who reported considerable differences in the generation process for problem-solving tasks in comparison to
classical generation tasks: While classical generation tasks
require a search in memory for a specific solution (often a
word), problem solving usually requires the construction of
a novel solution that is only based on memory content. This
may be one reason for differences in the generation effect in
problem solving and more classical generation tasks.
The Subjective Aha! Experience
Both the subjective Aha! experience and generation were
independently associated with relatively more positive emotional responses. As Sternberg (1969) suggested, such additivity might reflect different cognitive processes. Therefore,
one interpretation of both generation and Aha! being independently correlated with more positive responses is that
different emotions may contribute to the positive feeling.
This would also support the notion that the positive emotion which accompanies the Aha! experience is not the pride
of solving the problem (Gruber, 2005; Topolinski & Reber,
2010). It has even been reported that this emotional response
precedes the finding of a solution (Gruber, 2005). However,
whether this positive emotional response truly is something
other than pride needs to be investigated in studies that focus
more on subjective reports such as those used by Danek and
colleagues (2014). Nevertheless, only generation but not the
Aha! experience was accompanied by enhanced later memory. The absence of a significant relationship between Aha!
and later memory is in contrast with the results of Danek et
al. (2013a) and Kizilirmak et al. (2015). A main difference
between those two studies and the current one is the stimulus material. Danek et al. used magic tricks and Kizilirmak
et al. used Mooney images, that is, their stimulus material
was of a more visual nature and may therefore have been
more emotionally intriguing. The positive relationship of
Aha! to later memory was larger for the presented videos
of magic tricks than for the black and white Mooney images
(Danek et al., 2013a; Danek, Fraps, von Müller, Grothe, &
Öllinger, 2013b; Kizilirmak et al., 2015). It would be plausible
that positive relationship between Aha! and the emotional
response in the present study, which was also only half the
size of the one for Mooney images (Kizilirmak et al., 2015),
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was too weak to show a significant relationship with memory
performance one week later. However, since the named studies (Danek et al., 2013a; Kizilirmak et al., 2015) may be the
only two to have investigated the relationship between the
subjective feeling of Aha! and later memory, more studies
are needed to investigate the relationship between the type
of problem-solving task, the emotional response to the solution, and later memory performance.
Limitations and Differences From Previous Studies
A main limitation of the current study is that the problemsolving task employed here is relatively artificial. It is a task
very well suited for laboratory experiments in which many
trials of the same type are needed. However, in comparison with insights experienced in real life, the sudden comprehension of the solution to an individual problem may
not be nearly as compelling, and the individual trials may not
be nearly as distinct. This hypothesis is consistent with the
solution performance during the memory test being much
poorer than in other studies on learning from insight, which
looked at this measure using a small set of classic problems
(Ash & Wiley, 2008) or a single problem such as the nine-dot
problem (Ash et al., 2012; Dominowski & Buyer, 2000). In
the current study, participants were presented with 135 trials
of the same problem type. This way, each trial was not nearly
as distinctive as the ones in the cited studies. Distinctiveness
is known to be an important factor for later memory performance (Eysenck, 1979).
Another limitation of this study is the difference in exposure time of the solution across different levels of generation.
Total trial time was held constant, representing a considerable methodological advantage; however, it was not possible
to hold both the presentation time of the triad and the presentation time of the solution constant. The differences in
exposure time to the solution may, therefore, have influenced
later memory. For the direct memory test this potential confound is unproblematic, because the differences in recognition rates were not correlated with the exposure times. At
encoding, the exposure-time pattern for the solution was
read > generate > fail-to-generate, but on the later memory
test the pattern was generate > fail-to-generate > read. For
the indirect memory measure, the pattern of solution rates at
test was generate > read > fail-to-generate. Although not an
identical pattern to the exposure times at encoding, the poor

A Special Case of Generation Effect

test performance for fail-to-generate might indeed reflect the
shortest exposure time at encoding. This possible confounding factor should be evaluated in future studies.
Lastly, although participants were asked to make their
Aha!/no Aha! decision for both generated and presented
solutions, it may be that there were qualitative differences.
Those differences may be confounded with the different levels of generation, and later memory performance. However,
the results of the analysis of the emotional response revealed
that at least in regard to this qualitative feature, Aha! and
generation were independent, suggesting that in this regard
the quality of an Aha! experience is not confounded with the
level of generation.
Conclusions
The main finding was that the generation effect for CRAT
problems shows a distinctive pattern of memory performance depending on the type of test, that is, solving old
items (indirect test) versus recognizing old items or solutions (direct test). While even attempts to generate had an
advantage over the read condition in recognition memory
performance (generate > fail-to-generate > read), only when
generation was successful did it enhance the solution rate
of old items during test (generate > read > fail-to-generate).
Our results suggest that, contrary to what has been proposed
in typical generation studies, fail-to-generate does not necessarily enhance later memory for the solution. Thus, the
generation effect in problem-solving tasks such as the CRAT,
in which a novel solution has to be constructed based on
existing knowledge rather than just retrieving the solution
from existing knowledge (typical generation studies), seems
indeed to be a special case of the generation effect. Here,
being exposed to a solution for a longer time (read) seems to
be more helpful for solving the same problem later on than
being presented with the solution after a failed attempt at
problem solving. Whether this pattern holds also for other
problem-solving tasks that have been used to study creativity
and insight warrants further investigation. From an educational point of view, this result suggests that different learning strategies should be used depending on how knowledge
is tested: When the solution has to be remembered upon the
presentation of the problem (especially relevant for a free
response test format), trying to solve the problem on one’s
own during initial exposure to the problem is not always best.
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Notes
1. It should be noted that some classical generation tasks may
also be solved by insight. One common task used in insight
research and generation effect studies is solving anagrams
(Bertsch et al., 2007; Kounios & Beeman, 2009; Metcalfe,
1986b). In generation studies they are simple enough to
be always solved, but the way the solution is found may
sometimes be through sudden, not gradual, insight.
2. Holding the presentation time constant for both the problem and the solution in the same experiment was not
possible. In the case of generation, the solution has to be
presented directly after the participant comes up with
it, because even if one would continue the display of the
problem without the solution, the solution would be active in the participant’s mind. Moreover, that procedure
could have even more complex consequences, such as the
participants having time to question the solution they
came up with, which would make any clear conclusions
about encoding differences due to the GENERATION
conditions themselves impossible.
3. New items consisted of a subsample of CRA items, the
same as in Experiment 1. Thus, even though the triad of
new items was never presented in Experiment 2, the solution had valid remote associations.
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